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USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6614

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR NATO UR

SUBJ: SPC PAPER REVERSE CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE (FINAL VERSION)

MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW FINAL VERSION OF SPC PAPER ENTITLED "POSSIBLE REVERSE LINKAGE BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR" WHICH WAS NOTED AND APPROVED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 27 (SEPTEL). ADDRESSEES WILL NOTE THAT ANTE-PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 8 NOW CLOSES WITH U.S.-PREFERRED PHRASE (STATE 256622) "...ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THE PAST AND COULD BE SO IN THE FUTURE UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES." WHILE THIS LANGUAGE WAS REJECTED IN NOVEMBER 21 SPC DISCUSSION (USNATO 6481), SPC'S VOLUNTARY REINSERTION OF LANGUAGE DID NOT PROMPT REACTION OF PERMREPS. IT THEREFORE REMAINS IN APPROVED PAPER. BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE SOVIETS HAVE STRONGLY IMPLIED A CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE
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BY TELLING THE ALLIES THAT SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CSCE WOULD SPUR PROGRESS IN MBFR(1). AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 2ND OCTOBER, THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TABLES ON THE SOVIET UNION BY

ESTABLISHING SUCH A LINK OURSELVES, BUT IN REVERSE FORM, I.E. MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CSCE CONTINGENT UPON EASTERN MOVEMENT IN MBFR.

2. AS AGREED BY THE COUNCIL ON THAT OCCASION, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH A VIEW TO CLARIFYING THE ISSUES INVOLVED BEFORE FURTHER DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL.

3. THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION; GIVEN THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT FAVOUR THE HOLDING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, IT DID NOT SEE GROUNDS FOR A LINK BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE. THE FRENCH DELEGATION DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE DRAFTING OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS PAPER. OTHER DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REVERSE LINKAGE AND STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING IT AT THIS TIME.

4. THE SPC'S ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS INVOLVED IS AS FOLLOWS.

BASIC PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS

5. ALTHOUGH INTERRELATED HISTORICALLY, CSCE AND MBFR ARE CHARACTERIZED BY CERTAIN BASIC DIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLICATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK:

(A) THE DIFFERENCE IN TIMESCALES. CSCE APPEARS CERTAIN TO END LONG BEFORE MBFR IS COMPLETED, THOUGH A POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PHASE 1 OF MBFR COULD BE CONCLUDED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE CSCE. IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, IN THE EVENT, RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT TO PAY A PRICE IN MBFR FOR PROGRESS IN CSCE;

(1) MR. GROMYKO IN SPEECH OF 7TH NOVEMBER: "A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF CSCE WILL MAKE THE ATMOSPHERE MORE FAVOURABLE FOR SOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES INCLUDING MBFR"
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(B) THE DIFFERENCE IN PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS; MBFR IS CONFINED TO NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHILE CSCE INCLUDES NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE IDEA OF REVERSE LINKAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY IF NOT MOST NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE, AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ALIENATING THEM FROM THE OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS BEING PURSUED IN THE CSCE BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS;

(C) IN BOTH CSCE AND MBFR, BOTH EAST AND WEST HAVE OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE. THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE THE DEMANDEURS IN MBFR. IN TRYING TO TURN THE TABLES, A PROBLEM

IS THAT THE ALLIES ARE ALSO DEMANDEURS IN GENEVA, AND THE SOVIETS ARE CLOSER THAN THE WEST TO ACHIEVING A DEGREE OF SATISFACTION. THEIR REMAINING MAJOR OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE CONFIRMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN EUROPE THROUGH THE HOLDING OF A FINAL PHASE AT SUMMIT LEVEL, A FINAL DOCUMENT IN A FORM ACCEPTABLE TO THEM, AND AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW-UP MEASURES SATISFACTORY FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT. HOW MUCH OF A PRICE THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PAY FOR ATTAINMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES IS NOT, HOWEVER, CLEAR.

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE OPTIONS WHICH ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. THEY HAVE IN COMMON THAT THEY DO NOT INVOLVE ANY ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN CSCE IN RETURN FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN MBFR.

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OPTION A

A SERIES OF BILATERAL DEMARCHES STRESSING THE INEVITABLY INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WITHOUT ANY FORMAL REFERENCE TO REVERSE LINKAGE.

ADVANTAGE SUCH A STEP COULD BE TAKEN AT ANY TIME AND WOULD COMMIT THE ALLIANCE TO NO PARTICULAR LINE OF ACTION. IT COULD BE A PRELIMINARY TO MORE SPECIFIC MEASURES.

DISADVANTAGES (I) BECAUSE OF INEVITABLE VARIATIONS IN PRESENTATION OF SEPARATE DEMARCHES, THIS WOULD INVITE SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING. FAILURE BY SOME COUNTRIES TO JOIN IN THE DEMARCHES WOULD FURTHER INCREASE WEDGE-DRIVING.

(II) SUCH DEMARCHES WOULD PUT NO SPECIFIC PRESSURE ON THE WARSAW PACT AND INDEED MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO PRESS THEIR OWN NOTION OF LINKAGE MORE STRONGLY.

OPTION B

SIMILAR ACTION TO "A", BUT CONDUCTED NOT THROUGH BILATERAL APPROACHES, BUT BY SUIABLE WORDING IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHICH MIGHT REFER BACK APPROPRIATELY TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE BONN COMMUNIQUE OF 31ST MAY, 1972, AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE OF 8TH DECEMBER, 1972.

ADVANTAGE UNLIKE "A" THIS APPROACH WOULD SERVE TO UNDERLINE THE CONSISTENCY OF THE STANCE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

DISADVANTAGES (I) IT WOULD STILL LEAVE ROOM FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND THE NATO PARTICIPANTS AND, ON THE OTHER, THE OTHER NON-WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS.

(II) AS IN DISADVANTAGE (II) TO "A".

OPTION C

AN INDICATION TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, UNTIL THERE WAS PROGRESS IN MBFR, THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS, AT PRESENT HELD UP BY SOVIET TACTICS, WOULD BE DELIBERATELY SLOWED DOWN FURTHER BY ACTION ON THE ALLIED SIDE WHO, BY CONTRAST, HAD TO DATE, BEEN DOING THEIR BEST TO MOVE THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS FORWARD.

ADVANTAGE IT WOULD PLAY ON SOVIET UNEASE ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS OF BASKET III, AS WELL AS ON THEIR DESIRE FOR A RAPID CONCLUSION TO STAGE II AS A WHOLE AND THE EARLY HOLDING OF A FINAL STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

DISADVANTAGES (I) IT PREMISES READINESS TO SLOW DOWN STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS IN FACE OF SOVIET BAIT INVITING PROGRESS.

(II) A "SLOW DOWN" IN GENEVA IS UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-NATO AND NON-WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS IN CSCE. IT MAY ALSO BE SUBJECT TO PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC CRITICISM IN BOTH NATO AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY ON THIS.

(III) IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE BOTH WHAT EASTERN CONCESSIONS IN MBFR WOULD BE THOUGHT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY LETTING OFF THE BRAKE IN GENEVA, AND ALSO, DEPENDING ON HOW THE GENEVA BRAKE HAD BEEN APPLIED, HOW THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE REVERSED. BECAUSE THE CSCE WOULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE A FINAL MBFR AGREEMENT THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM OF ENSURING THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN VIENNA WERE RESPECTED AND OF LASTING VALUE.

(IV) THE PRESSURES CREATED WOULD STRAIN ALLIANCE
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COHESION AND GIVE FRESH OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING AMONG THE ALLIES.

(V) IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE RESOLUTELY TO OPPOSE SUCH A "TRADE-OFF", THERE COULD BE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR DETENTE.

OPTION D

A WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, EVEN IF THE RESULTS IN STAGE II OF THE CSCE WERE SATISFACTORY, ALLIED LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT NOT FEEL ABLE TO ATTEND IN PERSON THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CSCE IF THERE WERE NOT PROGRESS ACROSS THE WHOLE FIELD OF DETENTE, INCLUDING MBFR.

ADVANTAGES (I) THIS APPROACH WOULD HIT THE USSR AT A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SPOT, NAMELY THEIR ATTACHMENT TO A "TOP LEVEL" CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE.

(II) IT WOULD NOT ENTAIL ANY INTERFERENCE WITH THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES IN THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE THE ALLIANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR OPTIMUM RESULTS.

(III) OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING WOULD BE REDUCED.

DISADVANTAGES (I) THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING ON THE REQUIRED SOVIET QUID PRO QUO IN MBFR WOULD REMAIN.

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(II) IF THE EFFECT WAS TO DELAY OR APPEAR TO

JEOPARDIZE THE HOLDING OF STAGE III, THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NEUTRALS AND PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION. THE ALLIANCE COULD HOWEVER ANSWER ANY CRITICISM BY MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY WERE STILL WILLING TO ATTEND A FINAL STAGE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AS ORIGINALLY PREFERRED BY THEM.

(III) GIVEN THE PREVIOUS POSITIONS OF SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, THE INTRODUCTION OF PROGRESS IN MBFR AS A CONDITION FOR A HIGH LEVEL CSCE STAGE III COULD BE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IF THROUGHOUT STAGE II IT HAD CONTINUED TO BE STATED THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE READY TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL STAGE III ON CONDITION THAT THE OUTCOME OF STAGE II WAS SATISFACTORY WITHOUT FURTHER QUALIFICATION.

7. THE COMMITTEE ALSO CONSIDERED A FURTHER FORM OF REVERSE LINKAGE WHICH, CONTRARY TO THE OPTIONS LISTED ABOVE, WOULD REQUIRE THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS IN CSCE.

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OPTION E

AN INDICATION TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, IN RETURN FOR ASSURANCES OF PROGRESS IN MBFR, THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER WHETHER CONCESSIONS ON THEIR PART IN STAGE II OF CSCE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

ADVANTAGES (I) CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE OBTAINABLE IN MBFR WHICH WOULD NOT BE OBTAINABLE UNDER THE OTHER OPTIONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(II) THE WEST WOULD STAND TO LOSE LITTLE IF THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE WEST'S PRECONDITION FOR SUC LINKAGE AND COULD GAIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE.

DISADVANTAGES (I) DIFFICULTY OF AGREEMENT ON WHAT CONCESSIONS COULD BE OFFERED IN CSCE. THESE COULD NOT BE IN BASKET III. ALTHOUGH LESS ESSENTIAL DESIDERATA COULD BE USED IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NONE THE LESS LIKELY THAT SOME HARD CHOICES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

(II) DIFFICULT ALLIED DECISIONS WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED ON WHAT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN MBFR WERE MOST IMPORTANT AND COULD REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO BE ACHIEVED.

(III) IT COULD MAKE SUBSEQUENT ATTAINMENT OF OTHER ALLIED MBFR DESIDERATA MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE ONCE THE CSCE BARGAINING CHIP WAS EXPENDED.

(IV) COULD, IF THE LINKAGE BECAME STALLED, LEAD TO A STATE OF GENERAL IMMOBILITY AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE COURSE OF DETENTE.

(V) CSCE NEUTRALS MIGHT FIND LINKAGE OBJECTIONABLE.

SUMMING UP

8. GIVEN THE PREVIOUS POSITION OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, AND ALSO THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ITSELF ATTEMPTING TO LINK CSCE

AND MBFR, THE DELEGATIONS DRAFTING THIS PAPER (ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION AS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE) WERE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WAS LEGITIMATE TO CONSIDER REVERSE LINKAGE. IF REVERSE LINKAGE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING IN MBFR CONCESSIONS NOT OTHERWISE OBTAINABLE, THIS WOULD BE A GAIN. BUT ANY LINKAGE WHICH AFFECTED THE CONDUCT OF STAGE II OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RUN THE RISK OF DEALOCK, ADVERSE PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC REACTION AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON DETENTE, AS WELL AS THE DISADVANTAGE IN OPTION E OF MAKING CONCESSIONS IN CSCE. REVERSE LINKAGE WOULD ALSO
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OFFER WIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING BY CREATING STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND BY ALIENATING THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED FROM THE ALLIED CAUSE IN GENEVA. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TYPE OF PRESSURE ON THE USSR IS NOT PREDICTABLE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THE PAST AND COULD BE SO IN THE FUTURE UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DEVELOP LATER IN THE CSCE AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCING "REVERSE LINKAGE" MAY BE MORE FAVOURABLE THAN AT PRESENT. THE POSSIBILITY IS THEREFORE ONE TO BE BORNE IN MIND, EVEN IF ACTION IS NOT JUDGED DESIRABLE AT THIS MOMENT.

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